# STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS IN OH-AMR





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# **Background and objectives**

- Social-ecological system approach for conservation of bacteria susceptibility
  - Common pool resources
  - Actors



Mc Ginnis & Ostrom, 2014

Erasmus & Gilson, 2008







### **Measuring interactions in OH-AMR**

- To evaluate the state of the OH-AMR policy agenda?
- To support policy implementation in OH-AMR





# **1. Evaluating the state of OH-AMR policy agenda**

- What's in research?
- What's in the public sphere?





Walt & Gilson, 1994

### **Policy triangle**

THE SIMPSON CENTRE.









### Main information







### **Most relevant sources**









### **Collaboration Network - Authors**







### Institutions







### Affiliations

univ peruana caveta

swiss trop and publ hlth inst







### **Corresponding Author's Countries**





### **Countries' Collaboration World Map**







### **Tree-field Plot**

Titles

#### Affiliations

Author's Keywords







# Approach

#### Media scraping

#### Vitorino et al., forthcoming







# The first Tool : The Gdelt Project

The Gdelt project is a data base of all articles published and similar publications in the world since 1979.

Principal sources : online newspapers, news websites, blogs, news agencies, government organizations, international organizations, NGOs.





### Preliminary findings & discussion

#### ✤ To be confirmed

- OH-AMR is still siloed
- Not a public problem

#### Hypotheses

- Not novel enough
- Not severe enough
- Who are the champions?

#### ...Il Orange F < 15:08

#### Glasgow Warriors 19-43 Toulon: French side power to EPCR Challenge Cup

By Tom English BBC Scotland at the Aviva Stadium

19 May 2023



The great Sergio Parisse scored one of bbc.com





La Rochelle's Romain Sazy, head coach Ronan O'Gara and Gregory Alldritt with the Heineken Champions Cup trophy after La Rochelle beat Leinster at Aviva Stadium, Dublin, on Saturday. Photograph: Laszlo Geczo/Inpho







# 2. Approaches to support policy change

#### Rational approaches

- Multicriteria decision analysis
- Game theory





### Multicriteria decision analysis

Marechal, 2016 http://www.promethee-gaia.net



## Set of methods used as decision support tool

- Support decision-making process by taking into consideration multiple criteria simultaneously
- Participatory approach
- Ability to set individual preferences for each stakeholder in the weighting criteria process
- Advantage : quantitative and qualitative data in the analysis.











# **Evaluating the societal acceptability of reducing AMU : a pilot study in the French dairy sector**

1) Define problem and identify stakeholders

2) Identify key decision issues and define indicators

3) Identify interventions or strategies to compare

- 1. Current AMU scenario
- 2. Prohibition scenario (antibiotic free)
- 3.Subsidies to reduce antibiotic use by 25%
- 4. Preventive and metaphylaxis prohibition





Manriquez et al., 2022







## Calibration

Literature review

Dimensions	Indicators	Current AMU Scenario	Antibiotic prohibition	Subsidies to reduce antibiotic use by 25%	Preventive and metaphylaxis prohibition	
Economic	PC: production cost	494€/1000L	684€/1000L	617,5 €/ 1000 L	667 €/ 1000 L	
	FR: farmers revenues brut	334€/1000L	473 €/ 1000 L	417.5 €/ 1000 L	451 €/ 1000 L)	
	PCU: price of cull cow	2.4 €/ kg net	2.64 €/ kg net	2.4 €/ kg net	2.4 €/ kg net	
	PCA: price of 15-day calf	115€	126, 5€ 115€		115€	
	PP: product price	0.78€/L	1,85 €/L	0,97 €/L	1,05 €/L	
Environment	ALEA	0.273	0	0.204	0.177	
	FA: fraction attributable	4%	0	3%	2.6%	
Social	MR: mortality rate	3.8%	4.8%	4.04%	4.1%	
	CR: culling rate	21.3%	50.5%	28.6%	31.5%	
Political	PN: regulatory framework	Moderate	Very high	Moderate	High	
	PI: policies investments	High	High	Very high	Moderate	





# Weighing and ranking

Each stakeholder individually

	Indicators	Weights						
		<b>S1</b>	<b>S2</b>	<b>S3</b>	S4	<b>S</b> 5	<b>S6</b>	
EcoD	PC	8	2	0,5	15	10	7	
	FR	20	4	0,5	20	10	7	
	PCU	10	2	0,5	15	10	2	
	PCA	8	2	0,5	15	10	2	
	PP	5	4	8	10	10	6	
	Total	51	14	10	75	50	24	
EnvD	ALEA	15	25	10	5	10	17	
	FA	15	25	30	5	10	17	
	Total	30	50	40	10	20	34	
SocD	MR	3	6	15	5	10	8	
	CR	2	6	10	5	10	8	
	Total	5	12	25	10	20	16	
PolD	PN	12	12	10	2,5	5	13	
	PI	2	12	15	2,5	5	13	
	Total	14	24	25	5	10	26	
	TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	
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### Challenges

- Defining the indicators
- Valuing the indicators (inc. weighing)
- Closely ranked scenarios can exhibit high differences





# Game theory principles

#### Game: defined by three parameters:

- a set of players (or agents)
- their action sets (or strategy sets)
- their payment functions (or utility functions)

#### Rational players

- Maximize their utilities
- Know that the others, too

#### Different forms of game

- Cooperative/non cooperative
- Symmetric/asymmetric
- Perfect/imperfect information





# Game theory: application 1

#### 

- Cooperative vs non cooperative
- 2 pay-off criteria
  - Profitability : annual cost savings (ACS) and the annualized crossplant piping cost
  - Sustainability : overall reduction of fresh water and wastewater flowrates upon the implementation of IPWI.
- An IPWI scheme with a lower overall water flowrates will achieve higher sustainability payoff as it is more environmental friendly



Game theory approach to the analysis of inter-plant water integration in an eco-industrial park

Irene Mei Leng Chew<sup>a</sup>, Raymond R. Tan<sup>b</sup>, Dominic Chwan Yee Foo<sup>a,\*</sup>, Anthony Shun Fung Chiu<sup>b</sup>



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### **Game theory: application 2**



Antibiotic stewardship from a decision-making, behavioral economics, and incentive design perspective

Brendan Bettinger<sup>a</sup>, James C. Benneyan<sup>b,\*</sup>, Tannaz Mahootchi<sup>c</sup>





Fig. 7. Impact of an antibiotic use tax on utility for healthcare system H1 as a function of prescribing threshold  $s_{\rm H1}$ .

### **Game theory: application 3**

Players: insects, farmers, manufacturers, regulators

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

**ScienceDirect** 

Joel S Brown<sup>1,2</sup> and Kateřina Staňková<sup>3</sup>

- Evolutionary game for insects
- Strategic game for human beings
- Ecologically enlightened management
- Evolutionary enlightened management

ELSEVIER

THOUGHT

insect pests



### Challenges

- Oversimplification
- Need for high resolution data
- Theory is better at explaining outcomes when arguments are settled
- Uncertainty and lack of institutionalization





# Summary

- Quantitative approaches for
  - Modeling AMR policies
  - Monitoring AMR discussions

#### Many tools have been developed and used to study other challenges

- AMR is a little bit more complex (indicators of resistance, bacteria evolution, multiple AMs, multiple AM users, local and global governance...)
- Does AMR require a OH approach?





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#### Questions?

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